Introduction
North Korea, the most isolated state in the world, regards itself as a "socialist dynasty" and embraces a unique ruling ideology. The North defines itself as a Kim Il-Sung nation: the leader is worshipped as a deity and political power has been passed from the regime's founding leader (Kim Il-Sung) to his son (Kim Jong-Il) . The political leader has absolute power over the entire society.
Events that occur in the country often make no sense to outsiders. Indeed, North Korea's policies often seem hopelessly backward. Nevertheless, the regime has persisted, even under the devastating economic crisis of the 1990s.
What, then, is actually happening in North Korea? Can the regime continue to survive in the future? Although it is difficult to evaluate the country's internal dynamics, due mainly to a lack of accurate information, this paper will show that signs of potential change have emerged within the Pyongyang regime. In particular, we will examine a seemingly paradoxical link between ideological change, stepped-up propaganda campaigns, and the shaky social foundation of state-society relations.
Contemporary North Korea may be characterized ideologically as a social institutionalization of Juche ideology, which then shifted to the far-right Songun Jungchi (Military-first politics) and Kangsong Daekook (Strong and Prosperous State). Politically, it relies on a single stratum of leadership and rigid social management and control. The Juche ideology launched by Kim Il-Sung has long penetrated into every aspect of North Korean life, primarily via the bombardment of propaganda campaigns. The ideology has further radicalized into militarism during Kim Jong-Il's era, driving the country into a retrogressed garrison state.
ested in examining a puzzle: Specifically, why has this ideological radicalizai ion, designed to bolster popular support for the leader and his policies, ironically weakened Kim's political legitimacy? North Korea had built a unique nation-state, separate from the former Soviet bloc and founded on its own ruling ideology. The North distanced itself from other socialist regimes during the collapse of the Soviet Union by focusing on the strength of that ideology. However, signs of a crumbling regime are emerging, with the weakening of ideology towards the garrison state and the far-right nationalism, on one hand, and the failure of the regime's ability to provide goods to its people, on the other.
North Korea's Ruling Ideology and Its Metamorphosis
The polity of North Korea is based on Juche ideology. The origin of Juche doctrine is historically associated with the consolidation of Kim Il-Sung's regime. Since the Kim Il-Sung era, the Juche doctrine has become deeply institutionalized, has exerted a very distinctive form of influence on society, and has pervaded every level of North Korean life. Thus, to understand the country's behavior, Juche ideology must be elaborated in detail.
The Juche idea emerged as a reaction to external and internal ideological disputes surrounding the Soviet Union and China, particularly the de-Stalinization of the Soviet Union after Stalin's death. Kim Il-Sung rejected de-Stalinization, mainly because his own ideological rhetoric and, thus, political legitimacy, were based on Stalinism. Meanwhile, North Korea increased its autonomy from Chinese intervention and Chinese influence on its domestic politics.1
The North's leadership in its early era was composed of various factions supporting either China or the Soviet Union. Naturally, each faction struggled to provide its own interpretation and application of Marxism-Leninism to justify its power and to gain political legitimacy. The power struggle came to an end when Kim IlSung pushed for the idea of self-reliance, ultimately purging his opponents.
Juche emerged for the first time in a speech Kim Il-Sung delivered to the Korean Worker's Party (KWP) in 1955. The ideology was summarized in four slogans: "Juche in ideology," "sovereignty in politics," "self-support in economy," and "self-protection in defense." Within a decade, Juche became the ruling ideology of North Korea.2 However, Juche ideologues began gradually to replace the importance of nationalism with the "greatness" of Kim Il-Sung himself, and it was a turning point when the " Juche ideology" transmuted into "Kimilsungism."
Juche ideology fundamentally differs from Marxism in that its core idea is founded in spiritual determinism, as opposed to Marxism's reliance on historical materialism. Juche doctrine stresses the importance of people overcoming socio-economic obstacles under the direct guidance of the Great Leader, first Kim Il-Sung and now Kim Jong-Il. Juche theory views society as a sociopolitical organism: At the cen-ter is the Great Leader who is considered the "cerebral core" ( noesu ) of the regime.3
It is on this basis that the leader's absolute power is rationalized and justified. As a result, Kimilsungism, along with Juche ideas, came to substitute for Marxism-Leninism in North Korea.
Both the formation and consolidation of Juche ideology account for two important political events in North Korean history. First, when the North was founded, various factions (e.g., Kapsan , Yonan , the Soviet) appeared deeply divided along ideological lines, with each faction having its own input into building the newly established state. Kim Il-Sung used Juche , which stresses self-reliance and political independence from super-powers, to triumph over rival factions and obtain absolute political power in the North. Kim Il-Sung particularly emphasized the Juche ideology in taking an independent stance during the Sino-Soviet dispute.
Second, the regime took full advantage of Juche principles when North Korea withstood the collapse of its communist neighbors and patrons during the period from 1989 to 1991. The regime has invoked "North Korean exceptionalism" when confronting foreign superpowers (whether communist or democratic) by taking a staunchly independent position in politics, economics, and ideology. In addition, the North has been able to secure its sovereignty and independence by taking advantage of the international tensions over the Korean Peninsula.
As the regime emphasized the North Korean exceptionalism, Juche ideology metamorphosed into a unique brand of North Korean nationalism. The North has come to reject its initial notion of nationalism as a means of bourgeois ideology, with Kim Il-Sung's emphasis on " sahwejuui ekukjuui (socialist patriotism)" over " minjokjuui (nationalism)."4 It is notable that the concept of nation has come to refer to a specifically socialist nation.
The idea of socialist patriotism as an alternative to nationalism had come to dominate North Korean ideology by the 1970s. A nation, for instance, was defined in a North Korean dictionary as "a consolidated group of those who have been historically formed with commonality in language, region, economic boundary, culture and psychology," which provided an ideological justification for nationalism.5 North Koreas perception of nationalism gradually changed during the 1980s. According to the Hyundai Chosunmal Sajun (Dictionary of Modern Korean), published in 1988, nationalism is also defined as the following: 1) "in bourgeois societies, a reactionary idea that encourages conflicts and antagonism amongst nations ... as if the exploiting class* interest is equal to that of whole nation.
2) in colonies, a patriotic as well as progressive thought and its contention for national liberation to which pioneers gave rise before the working class in order to take revolutionary power. "7 This definition is, in its essence, no different from Stalin's.6 Furthermore, Kim
Il-Sung eventually claimed that "nation" takes priority over "class."8 The strengthening of the North's nationalism was accelerated by the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. Obviously, the North had to manage the moral crisis caused by the collapse of most socialist regimes, and did so by leaning on nationalism ("Korean Greatness" as a nation) rather than socialism.9 The "nation" in this context refers to the "Kim Il-Sung nation," which had been ideologically shaped by Kimilsungism. Kim North Korean propagandists have forged Kim Il-Sung as the world's greatest nationalist, enabling Korea to emancipate itself from the imperial powers of Japan, the U.S., the Soviet Union, and China. Prior to Japanese annexation, Korea, which was ruled for six hundred years by the Chosun dynasty, knew only a hierarchical authority pattern which was deeply institutionalized over the whole society. Post-Japanese rule, it was easy for Kim Il-Sung to exploit power in a society that did not have the sociopolitical experience of democracy, but rather deep-rooted historical legacies of feudalism and colonialism, by having people worship him as if he were an absolute king. According to Confucius, whose wisdom has long been internalized in Korean society, a king is like a father and citizens are like his children; that is, children (citizens) must respect and obey their father (king), and all members of society are under the king's power. Given the fact that the military was the only functioning organization in Nort Korean society, it was likely that Kim Jong-Il had no choice but to look to the tary for the survival of the regime. Furthermore, he had a firm grasp on the milit which allowed him to manage the crisis by mobilizing it. Intentionally or unin tionally, these effects resulted in strengthening the military's influence. For example, only one military official was a member of the Politburo in 1994, but more than five members of the military were elected to the Politburo in 1998. 29 Consequently, it is clear that the military is not only politically stronger but also wields enormous power in the post-Kim Il-Sung era.
North Korea is still a party-state. Yet, the society's trust in the party rapidly weakened as its role began to deteriorate,30 and the party began to lose its firm grip on the people. Likewise, the collapse of the economy and the failed delivery system of goods and services via the party-state weakened party authority in its function and discipline. Once the state was incapable of providing basic needs and paying wages for workers, such basic party organizations like workplaces became dysfunctional, impeding their ability to control the populace. The North's disaster was the occasion for the leadership to launch yet another policy. The North Korea government introduced a kind of comprehensive economic adjustment measure called the "July 1st Economic Adjustment" on July 1, 2002, which brought a partial market economic system to North Korea. The government cut down social welfare and began to levy taxes on the people.36 It was revolutionary for North Korea to take on the market economic system, and there have been some reports of economic success. Unfortunately, it also exacerbated the income gap between the Table 1 on page 57 presents, as a summary of our discussion, the changes the North has coped with by forging an ideological justification for specific events in its history. The ideology has shifted from Marxism and Leninism, to Stalinism, to Kimilsungism, to, currently, an extreme version of militarism ( Songun politics). Nationalism has been strongly associated with North Korea's socialist ideology throughout the metamorphoses. The current ideological trend under Kim Jong-Il's rule is best characterized as nationalism and militarism.
The course of ideological transformation under Kim Jong-IPs rule has been moving toward more extreme nationalism than any other period in North Koreas modern history. Ironically, though, the ideological evolution reflects the significantly There are substantial reports that such basic units of the North Korean society as the party and administration, venues of social welfare as well as control systems, have collapsed, revealing the limitations of ideological control of society. Regarding the potential of a regime change, it implies that cracks in the leadership stratum may not come from within the regime but, more ominously, from within society itself.
Accompanied by a lack of material benefits, extreme versions of ideological doctrines, and militarism, people of North Korea may have become alienated from ideology as well as from the regime.
Notes

